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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Rahman Fulton appeals his convictions for bank 
robbery and related offenses. He argues that the prosecution 
presented improper lay and expert witness testimony as well 
as misrepresented a key expert’s testimony during its closing 
argument. Although we agree with Fulton that the district 
court improperly admitted certain testimony as lay witness 
testimony, we conclude that the error was harmless. We also 
conclude that the prosecution neither presented improper 
expert testimony nor misrepresented the testimony of its 
expert during its closing. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court’s judgment of sentence.1  
 
I. 
 
A. The Robbery 
 
 On May 25, 2012, a large man who appeared to be 
wearing multiple layers of clothing entered the PNC Bank in 
North Randolph, Pennsylvania carrying a gun.2 He ordered 
everyone to the ground and demanded money from the 
tellers’ second drawers.3 Two PNC employees quickly 
handed him two stacks of cash, one of which contained a 
concealed Global Positioning System tracking device.4 The 
robber’s face was completely covered by a ski mask.5 The 
                                              
1 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2 J.A. 51-55 (Robin Hunt, PNC Bank employee); 74-75, 78, 
80 (Carol Viola, PNC Bank employee); 956-59 (Cynthia 
Womack, PNC Bank employee). 
3 J.A. 52 (Hunt), 957 (Womack). 
4 J.A. 52-53 (Hunt); 957-58 (Womack). 
5 J.A. 54 (Hunt testifying he wore “[f]ully covered mask, 
covered down [the] neck, had a s[w]eater on, like a dark-
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robber’s height was estimated as being anywhere from 6 feet 
to 6 foot 3 inches.6 One employee described him as having a 
“medium build” and being “solid,” but admitted she “couldn’t 
really totally tell [if he was] muscular or not because the way 
[he] was covered.”7 She estimated his weight at 220 or 230 
pounds.8 Another employee described him as “a husky man, 
built” and “not necessarily fat but, you know, muscular.”9 She 
said it was hard to tell his build because of his bulky 
clothing.10 The robbery occurred at 4:08 p.m., and lasted a 
matter of minutes.11 
The GPS device hidden inside the stack of bills 
activated as soon as it was removed from the teller’s drawer.12 
After the robber fled, the GPS device quickly led law 
enforcement officers to the neighboring town of Victory 
Gardens.13 Within minutes, dozens of police officers swarmed 
the area.14 The signals from the GPS then directed police to a 
building at 1 Jane Avenue.15 When police arrived at that 
location, they discovered fragments of the GPS in the 
                                                                                                     
colored sweater and like the mask and even had gloves on.”); 
959 (Womack describing the robber as “entirely covered in 
black clothing”). 
6 J.A. 55 (Hunt estimating 6’ to 6’3”); 80 (Viola estimating he 
was about 6’); 959 (Womack estimating 6’ to 6’2”). 
7 J.A. 55 (Hunt). 
8 J.A. 55 (Hunt). 
9 Id. at 80 (Viola). 
10 J.A. 80 (Viola). 
11 J.A. 98. 
12 J.A. 92 (Edward Farrington, PNC Bank employee); J.A. 
614 (Lieutenant Stephen Wilson). 
13 J.A. 617 (Lieutenant Wilson). 
14 J.A. 408, 410 (Detective Thomas Laird) (testifying that 
approximately 20-25 police vehicles responded from 
neighboring towns); 746 ((Lieutenant Jeffrey Gomez)) 
(testifying that approximately 20-30 police vehicles 
responded).  
15 Pursuant to court policy, in this opinion we do not list the 
actual addresses involved in this case.  J.A. 502-03 (Sergeant 
Carl LeMarble); 618 (Lieutenant Wilson) (radio 
communications indicated the device “was signaling in the 
area of [1 Jane Avenue]”). 
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backyard.16 Based on the GPS data, the government’s GPS 
expert testified at trial that the GPS was “disrupted”—likely 
smashed— between 4:18:37 and 4:18:53 p.m.17 Police did not 
recover any fingerprints of evidentiary value on the 
fragments.18 
Subsequent analysis of the GPS data led law 
enforcement to two suspects: Rahman Fulton and Ricardo 
Barnes. The GPS had signaled its location as 2-6 John 
Avenue immediately before it had been destroyed.19 Fulton 
and Barnes lived in opposite halves of a house located at that 
address. Two John Avenue was owned by Michael 
Calcaterra, who rented a room to Fulton,20 while the 6 John 
half belonged to Barnes’ mother, with whom Barnes lived.21 
The figure below depicts Fulton, Barnes, and the Calcaterra’s 
house and its relation to the 1 Jane Avenue backyard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
16 J.A.764 (Lieutenant Gomez); 822 (Lieutenant Gomez); 
455, 464-69 (Officer Kurt Edelman describing pieces). 
17 J.A. 313 (Expert Dr. Richard Andrew Fuller explaining that 
the sudden movement of the GPS device indicated in the GPS 
data at 4:18:37 can be explained by a sudden shock to the 
device, such as hitting the device against a rock); 1239 (GPS 
data displaying disruption). 
18 J.A. 831-32 (FBI Agent James Scartozzi). 
19 J.A. 293-94, 301-302. 
20 J.A. 165. 
21 J.A. 656. 
5 
 
2-6 John Avenue22 
       
 
 
 
The thick black line in this figure encloses the two-family 
home where the Calcaterras, Fulton, and the Barnes lived. 
The dashed line down the middle demarcates the boundary 
between the two residences. 
 
B. Rahman Fulton 
 
At the time of the robbery, Rahman Fulton was 
employed as a sanitation worker for the Morris County 
Municipal Utilities Authority.23 Despite this source of 
income, he was slightly behind on his rent payments24 and 
owed his girlfriend some money.25  
Officers first spoke to Fulton on the day of the robbery 
as they canvassed the Jane and John Avenue area after 
                                              
22 J.A. 1224, 1225, 1226, 166, 170-76 (Michael Calcaterra 
describing his half of the house), 942 (Michael Calcaterra’s 
son describing the layout of his house).  
23 J.A. 524-25. 
24 J.A. 178 (Michael Calcaterra). 
25 J.A. 606 (Rosalyn Torres, Fulton’s girlfriend at the time of 
the robbery). 
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locating the GPS.26 By then, Officer Edelman had heard a 
report that someone fitting the description of the perpetrator 
lived at 2 John.27 Following that lead, two officers went to 2 
John at around 6:00 p.m. and saw Fulton sitting on the 
stairs.28 When questioned about his whereabouts earlier that 
day, Fulton told them he had been at work.29 
 In a subsequent interview, however, Fulton admitted to 
the police that he had lied about being at work that day.30 
Instead, on the day of the robbery, Fulton had returned to 2 
John in the morning after spending the night at his girlfriend’s 
house.31 He then called in sick to work and spent the rest of 
the day around the house.32 At trial, Michael Calcaterra’s son 
corroborated Fulton’s story. He testified that Fulton came 
home that morning, went into his room, and then came out so 
the two could play video games together in the living room.33 
He further testified that after the games, Fulton returned to his 
room to watch TV and was home the rest of the day.34  
 At around 3:00 or 3:30 p.m.,35 Michael Calcaterra 
returned home from work and spent 10-15 minutes in his 
house before he and his son went next door to cut their 
neighbor’s lawn.36 The neighbor, Keith Munro, lives on John 
                                              
26 J.A. 473 (Officer Edelman), 620-21 (Lieutenant Gomez). 
27J.A. 481 (Officer Edelman). 
28 J.A. 620-21, 631 (Lieutenant Wilson). 
29 J.A. 622-23 (Lieutenant Wilson). 
30 J.A. 778-79 (Lieutenant Gomez). 
31 J.A. 593 (Torres). 
32 J.A. 526-27. The government points out that Fulton never 
provided his employer with a doctor’s note for his absence 
from work, as company policy required. However, his failure 
to provide a doctor’s note does not prove he was not sick. It 
only proves that he failed to comply with company policy. 
Similarly, the fact that he may have misrepresented that he 
was sick to his employer may show that he was not an 
exemplary employee, but it is hardly relevant to establishing 
that he is a bank robber.  
33 J.A. 938-41 (Michael Calcaterra’s son). 
34 Id. 
35 J.A. 179 (Michael Calcaterra). 
36 J.A. 180-81 (Michael Calcaterra). 
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Avenue.37 Michael testified that they likely started mowing at 
around 3:45 p.m.38 When defense counsel asked Michael’s 
son whether Fulton left the house while they were cutting the 
lawn, he replied, “No. He only sat on the porch,” where he 
had gone out to smoke.39 
 At 4:19:12 p.m., as police were arriving in the John 
Avenue neighborhood and seconds after the GPS device was 
destroyed, Fulton made a 12-second phone call to his sister’s 
girlfriend, Karina Echevarria.40 Echevarria worked at a Kmart 
in the same shopping center as the PNC Bank.41 Fulton 
occasionally picked Echevarria up from this Kmart and drove 
her to school.42  
 The government presented this call as a key piece of 
evidence in its case.43 Eight months after the robbery, 
Echevarria testified before a grand jury44 that:  
[Fulton] called me that day that the bank was 
robbed and he’s like, oh, did you hear? And I’m 
like, yeah, no. I said no, that I didn’t hear, and 
he told me, he’s like, oh, you know, this 
happened, you know, Victory Gardens is 
blocked off, so, I’m like, oh, that’s crazy.45  
 
Because the police were just beginning to arrive in Fulton’s 
neighborhood at the time he placed this call, the government 
argues that Echevarria’s testimony was probative of his 
guilt.46 According to the government, Fulton could not have 
known about the PNC robbery that occurred just 10 minutes 
prior to his phone conversation unless he was involved in the 
crime. 
 Fulton claimed that he did not call Echevarria to ask 
about the robbery. Instead, he suggested that she was the one 
                                              
37 J.A. 181 (Michael Calcaterra). 
38 J.A. 183 (Michael Calcaterra). 
39 Id. at 944-45 (Michael Calcaterra’s son). 
40 J.A. 571 (Karina Echevarria). 
41 J.A. 564 (Karina Echevarria). 
42 J.A. 564, 570 (Karina Echevarria).  
43 Appellee’s Br. at 31. 
44 Appellant’s Br. at 17. 
45 Id. at 569 (Karina Echevarria). 
46 Appellee’s Br. at 31. 
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who first told him about the robbery at the PNC Bank. At 
trial, the government confronted Echevarria with her grand 
jury testimony and asked her if she remembered who initiated 
the discussion of the bank robbery. She stated that she could 
not remember,47 but she believed Fulton discussed the bank 
robbery with her during her 4:19:12 p.m. phone with him that 
day.48 
 After the initial call from Fulton to Echevarria, 
Echevarria called Fulton back at 4:25 p.m. That call lasted 50 
seconds.49 At trial, Echevarria testified that she called him 
back after she went outside to assess what was going on at the 
PNC Bank.50  
 Based on this information as well as the GPS data, 
police executed a search warrant at 2 John Avenue on July 5, 
2012.51 They did not find any traces of the GPS nor any other 
evidence during that search.52 
 
C. Ricardo Barnes 
 
 Investigators first spoke to Ricardo Barnes on July 12, 
2012, nearly a month and a half after the robbery.53 Barnes 
told officers that he had been hanging out with a close friend, 
Nicola Gibbs, on the day of the robbery.54 He testified at trial 
that he was in the Orange-Irvington area doing some 
shopping that day.55 He also stated that Gibbs dropped him 
off at his mother’s house on John in the early evening.56 
 Barnes was unemployed at the time of the robbery.57 
He was doing odd jobs and primarily living with his mother. 
He had been fired from bank-teller jobs at Bank of America 
                                              
47 J.A. 572 (Karina Echevarria). 
48 J.A. 576 (Karina Echevarria). 
49 J.A. 579 (Karina Echevarria). 
50 J.A. 578-79 (Karina Echevarria). 
51 J.A. 777 (Lieutenant Gomez). 
52 J.A. 778 (Lieutenant Gomez). 
53 J.A. 784. 
54 J.A. 670 (Ricardo Barnes). 
55 J.A. 671 (Ricardo Barnes). 
56 J.A. 673, 683-85 (Ricardo Barnes). 
57 J.A. 681 (Ricardo Barnes). 
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and Wells Fargo Bank.58 He testified that neither Wells Fargo 
nor Bank of America places GPS tracking devices in the cash 
stacked in tellers’ drawers.59  
 The table below summarizes the timing of the relevant 
events on May 25, 2012.  
 
 
 
 
II. 
 Fulton’s trial began on January 14, 2014.60 After 
hearing all of the evidence, a jury convicted Fulton of the 
bank robbery as well as use of a firearm in furtherance of a 
crime of violence.61 He was subsequently sentenced to 57 
months in prison for the robbery and 84 consecutive months 
for the firearm offense.62 Fulton does not challenge this 
sentence on appeal. As noted at the outset, he bases his claims 
for relief on several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings 
as well as statements the prosecution made during closing 
arguments.  
 
A. Lay Opinion Testimony Regarding Barnes’ Cell Phone 
Usage 
                                              
58 J.A. 652-56 (Ricardo Barnes). 
59 J.A. 666 (Ricardo Barnes). 
60 J.A. 25. 
61 J.A. 3. 
62 J.A. 4. 
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 One of the principal reasons investigators eliminated 
Barnes as a suspect was that they believed he was on his 
phone when the robbery occurred. The government attempted 
to persuade the jury of this view through lay witness 
testimony from FBI Special Agent James Scartozzi. Agent 
Scartozzi testified that records of Barnes’ phone calls 
established that he was on the phone when the robbery 
occurred. Since none of the witnesses testified that the robber 
spoke on a phone during the robbery, Scartozzi told the jury 
that Barnes could not be the robber.  
 Fulton now argues that such testimony was improper. 
Because defense counsel did not object to Scartozzi’s lay 
opinion testimony at trial, we review for plain error.63  We 
agree that the district court did err in allowing Scartozzi to 
offer a lay opinion that Barnes was on the phone at the time 
of the robbery. However, we conclude that this error was 
harmless and therefore does not entitle Fulton to any relief.  
 
1. 
 
 Agent Scartozzi was the FBI case agent assigned to 
this crime. The government called him to testify as a 
summary witness, to provide the background of the 
investigation.64 Fulton objected, arguing a summary witness 
was not necessary. Although the trial judge agreed that the 
need for such a witness was “underwhelm[ing],”65 he 
nevertheless allowed Scartozzi to describe the investigation.66 
 In response to a line of questions regarding why he 
excluded Barnes as a suspect, Scartozzi testified that Barnes 
could not have committed the robbery because he was on the 
phone at the exact time it occurred. However, Barnes’ cell 
phone records only establish that Barnes received an 
incoming call at the time of the robbery (4:08:44 p.m.).67 The 
                                              
63 See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 
(1993). 
64 J.A. 816. 
65 J.A. 818. 
66 J.A. 818. 
67 J.A. 1229. 
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records do not show whether the call was answered or went to 
voicemail. Yet, based on the mere fact that Barnes received a 
call, Scartozzi assumed that Barnes took the call and had a 
conversation.68 He then concluded that Barnes could not have 
committed the robbery, and testified to that effect.69 
Scartozzi’s conclusion was based solely on his assumption 
that “if [Barnes] had committed the bank robbery, [he] would 
have had to have been on the cell phone while he was doing 
that.”70 
 Nevertheless, on cross-examination, defense counsel 
elicited a critical admission from Scartozzi: the call in 
question might have gone to voicemail.71 Defense counsel 
also called its own investigator, Nicole Dreyer,72 who 
testified that the 4:08:44 p.m. phone call did go to 
voicemail.73 Thus, the jury clearly understood that the mere 
fact that Barnes received a call at 4:08:44 p.m. did not mean 
he took the call at that time. Dreyer’s testimony was 
consistent with common sense.  
 Despite Dreyer’s testimony that the call in question 
went to voicemail, Scartozzi continued to testify, on re-direct, 
that Barnes’ cell records demonstrated he was not the 
perpetrator.74 Indeed, Scartozzi stated that this evidence was 
one of the “most important[]” factors that led him to exclude 
Barnes as a suspect.75 More specifically, when asked why he 
ruled Barnes out, Scartozzi replied: “There were several 
factors[,] . . . but, most importantly, his cell data showed that 
he was on the phone during the bank robbery . . . .”76  
 
2. 
                                              
68 J.A. 842. 
69 J.A. 846 (Scartozzi, direct) (“[W]e had the fact that he was 
on a phone call during the time of the bank robbery . . . .”); 
925 (Scartozzi, re-direct) (“[H]is cell data showed that he was 
on the phone during the bank robbery . . . .”).  
70 Id. at 842 (Scartozzi, direct). 
71 J.A. 894 (Scartozzi, cross). 
72 J.A. 989 (Nicole Dreyer). 
73 J.A. 997 (Nicole Dreyer). 
74 J.A. 925 (Scartozzi, redirect). 
75 Id. at 925 (Scartozzi, redirect).  
76 Id. (Scartozzi, redirect). 
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 Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits a non-expert 
witness to offer her opinion to the jury if, and only if, her 
testimony is: “(a) rationally based on the witness’s 
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s 
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based 
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
the scope of Rule 702.”77 Such testimony is known as lay 
opinion testimony, and the proponent of the testimony bears 
the burden of providing an adequate foundation for that 
testimony.78 If the testimony fails to meet any one of the three 
foundational requirements, it should not be admitted.79  
 In layman’s terms, Rule 701 means that a witness is 
only permitted to give her opinion or interpretation of an 
event when she has some personal knowledge of that 
incident. The objective of such testimony is to put “‘the trier 
of fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the 
event.’”80 In other words, “‘lay opinion testimony is 
permitted under Rule 701 because it has the effect of 
describing something that the jurors could not otherwise 
experience for themselves by drawing upon the witness’s 
sensory and experiential observations that were made as a 
first-hand witness to a particular event.’”81 This rule 
recognizes the reality that “eyewitnesses sometimes find it 
difficult to describe the appearance or relationship of persons, 
the atmosphere of a place, or the value of an object by 
reference only to objective facts.”82 Accordingly, it permits 
                                              
77 Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
78 United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 595-96 (6th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 
2005); United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 749 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
79 Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
80 Freeman, 730 F.3d at 595 (quoting Advisory Committee 
Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 701). 
81 Id. at 597 (quoting United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 
1085, 1120 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
82 Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211. 
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witnesses “to testify to their personal perceptions in the form 
of inferences or conclusory opinions.”83  
 Importantly, the rule is carefully designed to exclude 
lay opinion testimony that “amounts to little more than 
choosing up sides, or that merely tells the jury what result to 
reach.”84 Courts have recognized that this Rule does represent 
“‘a movement away from . . . courts’ historically skeptical 
view of lay opinion evidence,’ and is ‘rooted in the modern 
trend away from fine distinctions between fact and opinion 
and toward greater admissibility.’”85 Nonetheless, it seeks to 
protect against testimony that usurps the jury’s role as fact 
finder. While opinion testimony that “embraces an ultimate 
issue”86 to be decided by the trier of fact is not per se 
inadmissible, such testimony is barred when its primary value 
is to dictate a certain conclusion.87 “[T]he purpose of the 
foundation requirements of the federal rules governing 
opinion evidence is to ensure that such testimony does not so 
usurp the fact-finding function of the jury.”88  
 
3. 
 
 Fulton’s primary argument is that the district court 
should have excluded Scartozzi’s testimony under the first 
prong of Rule 701, i.e., Scartozzi’s testimony was not 
“rationally based on [his] perception.”89 In response, the 
                                              
83 Id. (citing Advisory Committee Notes on 1972 Proposed 
Rules and on 2000 Amendments and 4 Weinstein’s Federal 
Evidence § 701.03[4][b]). 
84 United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 262 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation marks, citations, alterations 
omitted). 
85 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. 
Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
86 Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). 
87 See 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.05 (noting that 
courts should be wary of opinion testimony whose “sole 
function is to answer the same question that the trier of fact is 
to consider in its deliberations”). 
88 Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 704 and 
Advisory Committee Notes on 1972 Proposed Rules). 
89 Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). 
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government argues that Scartozzi rationally based his opinion 
that Barnes was on the phone during the robbery on Barnes’ 
phone records.  
 Be these arguments as they may, we will focus on the 
second prong of Rule 701—the requirement that lay opinion 
testimony be “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s 
testimony or to determining a fact in issue”90—since it is 
dispositive. Scartozzi’s opinion regarding whether Barnes 
was on the phone was simply not helpful. In fact, it was the 
antithesis of helpful—it was dead wrong and even 
misleading. An opinion only qualifies as helpful “if it aids or 
clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise be as 
competent to understand.”91 Thus, where a witness is not in a 
better position than the jurors to form an opinion or make an 
inference, the witness’s opinion is inadmissible under Rule 
701(b).  
 We have consistently excluded testimony that meets 
the “rationally based” prong because it is insufficiently 
“helpful to the jury.” For example, in United States v. 
Dicker,92 our court excluded an agent’s testimony that 
interpreted an uncomplicated conversation for the jury. The 
district court had admitted the testimony, reasoning that “‘the 
conversations were truncated sentences, sentence fragments 
and incomplete thoughts,’” which relied on “‘code words.’”93 
We reversed on appeal, explaining that the recorded 
conversation was “perfectly clear” without the agent’s 
“interpretations,”94 and the jury should have “been allowed to 
draw its own conclusions regarding” the recording.95 
 Similarly, in United States v. Anderskow,96 we held 
that a witness’s lay opinion was inadmissible under Rule 
701(b) because the jurors themselves could have just as easily 
interpreted the evidence on which the witness opined. In that 
                                              
90 Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
91 Lauria v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
92 853 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 1988). 
93 Id. (citing district court opinion below).  
94 Id. at 1110 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
95 Id.; see United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 170-71 
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting this language). 
96 88 F.3d 245, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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case, a cooperating conspirator in a loan fraud conspiracy 
testified that he provided one of the defendants, Donald 
Anchors, with fraudulent documents to be passed along to 
borrowers.97 On direct examination, the government asked the 
cooperating conspirator whether Anchors would have been 
“deceived by the information that [the witness was] sending 
him.”98 The witness responded: “I had no reason to believe 
that he wasn’t fully aware of what was occurring, as long as 
he was getting paid.”99 We held that this testimony was 
inadmissible under Rule 701(b): “We do not understand how 
a witness’ subjective belief that a defendant ‘must have 
known’ [of the object of a conspiracy] is helpful to a 
factfinder that has before it the very circumstantial evidence 
upon which the subjective opinion is based.”100 “Stated 
another way, the witness’s testimony was not helpful—and 
thus inadmissible under Rule 701—because the jury was in 
just as good a position as the witness to infer what Anchors 
‘must have known.’”101 As we further pointed out, the 
government was free during closing to ask the jury to draw 
the inference the witness had drawn. But Rule 701(b) 
prohibited the government from calling a witness to offer this 
inference through opinion testimony.102  
 As the court of appeals for the First Circuit has 
explained, the “nub” of Rule 701(b)’s requirement is “to 
exclude testimony where the witness is no better suited than 
the jury to make the judgment at issue.”103 Accordingly, in 
United States v. Meises, the First Circuit ruled that where the 
jury had an opportunity to listen to all the same recordings as 
the testifying case agent, that agent’s testimony was 
inadmissible under 701(b) because he had no “insight to offer 
the jurors.”104 The agent “inferred [the defendant’s] roles not 
                                              
97 Id. at 249. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 250. 
100 Id. at 251. 
101 United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 265 (3d Cir. 
2010) (characterizing Anderskow’s holding as such). 
102 Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 251. 
103 United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 Id. 
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from any direct knowledge, but from the same circumstantial 
evidence that was before the jury—effectively usurping the 
jury’s role as fact-finder.”105 Again, while, “[i]t was perfectly 
appropriate for the prosecutor to argue in summation that the 
[relevant] evidence . . . supported the inference that they were 
the buyers,” the case agent’s testimony amounted “to simply 
dressing up argument as evidence.”106 Thus, where a case 
agent’s testimony leaves the jury “to trust that [the case 
agent] had some information—information unknown to 
them—that made him better situated to interpret the words 
used in the calls than they were,”107 when, in fact, he does 
not, such testimony is inadmissible under Rule 701(b).108 
 Scartozzi’s interpretation of Barnes’ phone records as 
a lay witness did exactly what the body of case law 
interpreting Rule 701(b) prohibits. Nothing about Barnes’ 
phone records was unclear, coded, or in need of 
interpretation. Instead, Scartozzi’s interpretation of Barnes’ 
phone record presents a quintessential example of “where the 
witness is no better suited than the jury to make the judgment 
at issue.”109 The “value” of Scartozzi’s testimony regarding 
the phone records was to “tell the jury what result to 
reach.”110  
 The government claims that Scartozzi’s testimony 
helped the jury assess whether Scartozzi prematurely 
excluded Barnes as a suspect. But Scartozzi’s opinion 
testimony did more than just shed light on the thoroughness 
(or lack thereof) of Scartozzi’s investigation. Scartozzi’s 
                                              
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 16-17.  
107 United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir. 
2013). 
108 See id. at 597-98; United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 
982-83 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Meises, 645 F.3d at 16-17; United 
States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750-51 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
109 Meises, 645 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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testimony provided a definitive interpretation of a crucial 
disputed fact—whether Barnes could have committed the 
robbery. Had Scartozzi testified that he excluded Barnes as a 
suspect because he assumed Barnes was on the phone, such 
testimony might have been helpful to determining why 
Scartozzi excluded Barnes as a suspect. However, Scartozzi 
did not frame his testimony this way. Instead, he stated that 
Barnes could not have committed the robbery because he 
“would have had to have been on the cell phone while he was 
doing that.”111 Such testimony usurped the jury’s role as fact 
finder.  
 Accordingly, Scartozzi’s testimony regarding whether 
Barnes could have committed the robbery due to the phone 
call he received does not meet Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness 
requirement. Because we conclude that Scartozzi’s lay 
testimony failed this second prong, we need not address the 
other two prongs of the Rule 701 test.  
 
4. 
 
 Despite the district court’s error in admitting 
Scartozzi’s testimony, we cannot reverse unless we find that 
this error was plain.112 To demonstrate plain error, an 
appellant must establish “that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the 
error is ‘clear or obvious, . . .’; (3) the error ‘affected the 
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case 
means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”113  
 Allowing Scartozzi’s testimony was an error that was 
clear and obvious as required under the first and second 
prongs of the harmless error test. Nevertheless, we conclude 
that Fulton has failed to show that the error affected his 
                                              
111 J.A. 842 (Scartozzi, direct). 
112 Because defense counsel did not object to Scartozzi’s lay 
opinion testimony at trial, we review for plain error. See 
United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010); 
see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). 
113 United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) 
(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 
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substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.  
 Despite Scartozzi’s dogged persistence in testifying 
that he eliminated Barnes because of the incoming phone call, 
defense counsel was able to solicit a concession from 
Scartozzi that the call in question could have gone to 
voicemail. This admission helped establish that Barnes was 
not necessarily on the phone at the time of the robbery. It 
exposed Scartozzi’s statement as a mere opinion, and an 
incorrect one at that. More importantly, Fulton’s investigator 
testified that the call in question did actually go to voicemail. 
Therefore, Fulton presented persuasive evidence that Barnes 
was not, in fact, on the phone at the time of the robbery. At 
the very least, defense counsel showed that Barnes should not 
have been excluded as a suspect merely because he received a 
call at 4:08 p.m. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that 
Scartozzi’s improper testimony affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings. 
 Moreover, at trial, the government presented 
unrebutted expert testimony interpreting Barnes’ cell phone 
data and concluding that his phone was most likely not at the 
PNC Bank at the time of the robbery. An FBI agent testified 
that Barnes’ cell data suggested his phone was probably not 
within 1,000 feet of the PNC Bank.114 This testimony 
mitigates the likelihood that Scartozzi’s testimony affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. Even without Scartozzi’s 
statement that Barnes was on his phone, the government still 
had evidence that Barnes’ phone (and therefore, likely, 
Barnes) was not at the PNC Bank during the robbery.115 
 Fulton’s contention that Scartozzi’s testimony 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of the judicial proceedings is just as weak. Although 
Scartozzi did persist in testifying on re-direct that part of the 
reason he excluded Barnes was because he received the 4:08 
p.m. call, the government did not rely on this testimony 
during closing. In fact, at closing, the government did not 
                                              
114 J.A. 729-31. 
115 See United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 266 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a Rule 701 error was harmless 
because the record as a whole suggested the conclusion the 
inadmissible evidence offered). 
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even mention Barnes’ phone call. Instead, “in urging a guilty 
verdict, the prosecution focused the jury’s attention only on 
the extensive admissible evidence supporting that result.”116 
Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court’s 
error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, we hold 
that the district court’s error was not plain. Thus, Fulton is not 
entitled to relief because of the erroneous admission of lay 
opinion testimony regarding Barnes’ phone call. 
 
B. Lay and Expert Testimony on the Appearances of Barnes 
and Fulton 
 
 Fulton claims that Scartozzi and another officer, 
Lieutenant Jeffrey Gomez, offered improper lay opinion 
testimony about the comparative appearances of Barnes, 
Fulton, and the person depicted in the surveillance video, in 
violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Fulton also argues 
that Gomez improperly presented expert testimony in 
violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Because defense 
counsel did not object to Gomez and Scartozzi’s statements at 
trial, our review of these issues is for plain error.117 We again 
agree with Fulton that the district court erred in admitting the 
agents’ testimony regarding the comparative appearances of 
Barnes and Fulton. However, we once again conclude that the 
error was harmless. Furthermore, we disagree with Fulton’s 
challenge to Gomez’s testimony under Rule 702.  
 
1. 
 
 A surveillance video captured footage of the robber 
demanding and receiving money from the bank tellers, and 
then leaving the bank. At trial, the government offered the 
testimony of Agent Scartozzi as well as another investigating 
                                              
116 United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(finding a Rule 701 error to be harmless, in part, because the 
government “never referenced it again throughout the case . . 
. much less ma[d]e improper use of [the] challenged opinion 
in summation”).  
117 See Christie, 624 F.3d at 567; see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 
731-32. 
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officer, Lieutenant Jeffrey Gomez. They both offered their 
opinions about whether Fulton or Barnes’ appearance better 
matched the robber in the surveillance video. Gomez testified 
that he watched the bank surveillance video and concluded 
that the suspect “was a very muscular male” and that “[g]iven 
the pictures, the height of the counters and stuff, he was six 
foot, maybe just over six foot tall.”118 Gomez also testified 
that he had personal knowledge of the PNC Bank at issue 
because he does his banking at that branch.119 Reviewing a 
still from the surveillance video,120 Gomez stated, “you can 
see the left arm, the bicep, you can see the definition, the 
contrast on the light-colored floor in the back, as well as the 
height of what I’ll refer to as the, I guess the cabinets in the 
middle.”121 Reviewing another surveillance video still,122 
which depicts the robber leaning over the bank counter, 
Gomez testified: “Once again, referring to the height, I’m 
about five foot eight, and standing at this counter here, I 
would not have the ability to lean over this counter . . . the 
way that the bank robber is in this picture.”123 Thus, Gomez 
concluded, “[t]hat leads me to believe that he’s at least six-
foot tall, maybe just over six-foot tall.”124 Regarding the 
suspect’s build, Gomez stated, “you look at the contrast of the 
light floor in the background and the arm here, as well as the 
shoulder, you can see that he has a muscular definition to 
him.”125 He added, “with reference to the clothing, you can 
see the outer garment in this picture, it’s too big for him.”126  
 Gomez also testified that when he met Barnes for the 
first time two months after the robbery, he concluded 
“immediately”127 that Barnes could not be the person in the 
surveillance video. He explained that Barnes “was a very, 
                                              
118 J.A. 769. 
119 J.A. 769. 
120 Id. at 1232. 
121 Id. at 769. 
122 Id. at 1220. 
123 Id. at 771. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 785.  
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very large male, over 300 pounds.”128 After reviewing a photo 
of Barnes at trial,129 Gomez said “Mr. Barnes lacked the 
muscular build that the bank robber had. You look at his mid-
section here, the front view,  at that time [Barnes] had a very, 
very large belly.”130 Estimating that Barnes weighed over 300 
pounds, Gomez concluded that Barnes was “[s]ignificantly 
heavier than the bank robber.”131 
 Scartozzi testified that he also excluded Barnes based 
on comparisons of photographs of Barnes132 with the 
surveillance video. He explained that the man in the 
surveillance video “looks fit, muscular, has an athletic build, 
and that’s denoted basically by their basic shape. Athletic 
build means that your waist is slimmer than your chest 
area.”133 When questioned about his physical observations of 
Barnes, he testified, “[a]lthough he’s a large African 
American male, his height is similar to that of the bank 
robber, his physical – his physique does not match in that he 
is not athletic, meaning his waist size is actually bigger than 
his chest size.”134 Based on his comparison of photos of 
Barnes to the surveillance footage, Scartozzi concluded that 
Barnes “did not match the physical descriptors of the bank 
robbery.”135 Scartozzi met Barnes for the first time at trial.136  
 At one point during Scartozzi’s testimony, while 
Scartozzi was explaining why he excluded other individuals 
as suspects, the trial judge warned the government against 
eliciting “any opinion about whether or not the defendant is 
the person who committed the bank robbery.”137 The judge 
cautioned, “he’s at best giving something vaguely resembling 
lay opinion testimony right now. . . . [H]e cannot give any 
                                              
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1231. 
130 Id. at 787. 
131 Id. 
132 J.A. 836 (reviewing Gov. Exh. 411, at J.A. 1231). 
133 Id. at 822. 
134 Id. at 836-37. 
135 Id. at 838. 
136 Id. at 902. 
137 Id. at 849. 
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opinion testimony in any way, shape or form of the ultimate 
issue in this case.”138  
 Despite this warning, the government elicited 
testimony from Scartozzi comparing photos of Fulton with 
the surveillance stills.139 Scartozzi described the photos of 
Fulton as depicting a “[v]ery athletic and thin” person with a 
“‘V’ shape to his body.”140 “He’s a very well developed 
individual as far as musculature,” with a “thin waist and wide 
upper body.”141 He concluded, based on his physical 
comparison of the bank robber and Mr. Fulton, that “Mr. 
Fulton’s body type and muscularity was similar to that of the 
person depicted in the PNC Bank surveillance video.”142 
 
2. 
 
 Fulton argues that Scartozzi and Gomez’s testimony 
meets neither the first nor second requirement of Rule 701: 
that the testimony be rationally based on the witness’s 
perception and be helpful to the jury. We address the second 
issue first. 
 This testimony fails Rule 701(b)’s helpfulness 
requirement. As previously explained, an opinion only 
qualifies as helpful “if it aids or clarifies an issue that the jury 
would not otherwise be as competent to understand.”143 Lay 
opinion testimony that aids in the identification of suspects 
“is particularly valuable where . . . the lay witnesses are able 
to make the challenged identifications based on their 
familiarity with characteristics of the defendant not 
immediately observable by the jury at trial.”144 In other 
words, “lay witness testimony is permissible where the 
witness has had sufficient contact with the defendant to 
                                              
138 Id. at 850. 
139 J.A. 852-56 (reviewing Gov. Exhs. 394, 394A and 392, at 
App. 1233, 1234, 1235). 
140 Id. at 853. 
141 Id. at 853-54. 
142 Id. at 856. 
143 Lauria v. Nat’l RR Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 
(3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).  
144 United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 
1986) (emphasis added).  
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achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion 
helpful.”145 As the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
held, whether 
lay opinion is helpful depends on a totality of 
the circumstances including the witness’s 
“[f]amiliarity with the defendant’s appearance 
at the time the crime was committed,” the 
witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s 
customary manner of dress, insofar as such 
information related to the clothing of the person 
depicted in the surveillance photograph, 
whether the defendant disguised his or her 
appearance during the offense or altered his or 
her appearance before trial, and whether the 
witness knew the defendant over time and in a 
variety of circumstances, such that the witness’s 
lay identification testimony offered to the jury 
“a perspective it could not acquire in its limited 
exposure” to the defendant.146 
 
This recognizes that the more familiar a witness is with a 
suspect’s appearance, the more useful her identification 
testimony is to the jury. At least in theory, a witness who is 
intimately familiar with a defendant’s appearance can 
perceive similarities and differences that jurors might not 
notice. In short, the witness may be in a better position than 
the jurors to make the identification from the relevant 
evidence. 
 For example, in United States v. Jackman,147 the First 
Circuit held that lay witness opinions regarding the identity of 
                                              
145 United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
146 Id. at 1015 (alterations in original) (quoting United States 
v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995), United States v. 
Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 774, 775 (11th Cir. 1998), United 
States v. Allen, 787 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1986) cert. 
granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1077 
(1987)); see also Jackman, 48 F.3d at 4-5; United States v. 
Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 445 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1984). 
147 48 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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a bank robber captured in surveillance photographs were 
admissible because those witnesses were intimately familiar 
with the suspect’s appearance. In that case, the surveillance 
photographs were somewhat blurred and only showed half of 
the robber’s face. Under those circumstances, the First Circuit 
held that the district court properly admitted the testimony of 
three witnesses who knew the defendant well and “had seen 
him on multiple occasions under a variety of 
circumstances.”148 The witnesses’ identification testimony 
was helpful because they knew the defendant’s appearance 
well and the surveillance photographs were unclear.149 As the 
First Circuit explained, the lay identification testimony was 
admissible because “the witness[es] possesse[d] sufficiently 
relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury [could 
not] also possess.”150 “[W]hen the photographs are not either 
                                              
148 Id. at 5.  
149 Id. at 5-6; see also United States v. White, 639 F.3d 331, 
336 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a defendant’s sister and 
girlfriend could opine on the defendant’s appearance, when 
surveillance footage of the crime was of poor quality, the 
perpetrator was wearing a bulky winter coat and pulled-down 
hat, and the defendant argued that the man captured in the 
surveillance video was really his uncle. Because both women 
knew the defendant and his uncle, “they were able to provide 
the jury with helpful insight regarding the true identity of the 
man shown in the surveillance video and counter [the 
defendant’s] claim that the still photograph really depicted 
[his uncle].”); United States v. Borrelli, 621 F.2d 1092, 1095 
(10th Cir. 1980) (“Since Borrelli lived with his stepfather for 
five years and had moved only a few days prior to the 
robbery, his stepfather had independent knowledge of 
Borrelli’s appearance both before and at the time of the 
robbery. . . . In the seven months between the robbery and 
trial, Borrelli had significantly altered his appearance . . . . 
Because Borrelli’s stepfather was in a much better position 
than the jury to give an opinion as to the resemblance 
between Borrelli at the approximate date of the robbery and 
the man in the surveillance photograph, this is an instance 
where the opinion testimony was helpful to the jury in the 
determination of a fact in issue.”). 
150 Jackman, 48 F.3d at 5-6. 
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so unmistakably clear or so hopelessly obscure that the 
witness is no better-suited than the jury to make the 
identification,”151 lay witness testimony is admissible.  
 
 Neither Scartozzi nor Gomez had sufficient familiarity 
with the appearances of Barnes or Fulton to assist the jury 
here. Neither testified to any familiarity with Barnes or Fulton 
apart from this case. Gomez’s in-person interactions with 
Fulton and Barnes were very limited and he did not interview 
Barnes until nearly two months after the robbery.152 
Accordingly, he could not claim any familiarity with Barnes 
at the time of the robbery. Scartozzi’s familiarity with Barnes 
and Fulton was even more attenuated. He did not meet Barnes 
until January 18, 2014, after Fulton’s trial began.153 These 
minimal relations provided neither Scartozzi nor Gomez with 
familiarity with the defendant’s appearance at the time the 
crime was committed, the defendant’s customary manner of 
dress, or the defendant in a variety of circumstances. 
Accordingly, their opinion testimony was not helpful within 
the meaning of Rule 701(b). These agents were no better 
equipped than the jurors to compare the suspect’s appearance 
with that of Barnes and Fulton. Testimony from lay witnesses 
whose exposure to suspects is “limited to three days in a 
sterile courtroom setting” is not helpful.154 Scartozzi and 
                                              
151 Id. at 6; see United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 
1160 (8th Cir. 1984) (“A witness’s opinion concerning the 
identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph is 
admissible if there is some basis for concluding that the 
witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from 
the photograph than is the jury.”).  
152 J.A. 784 (Gomez). 
153 J.A. 902, 904.  
154 United States v. Allen, 787 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1986), 
vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1077 (1987); see also 
United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 
1993) (excluding opinion testimony from an investigating 
police officer identifying defendant in a surveillance 
photograph because defendant’s appearance had not changed 
between time of robbery and trial and officer’s testimony 
regarding the defendant’s appearance “was based entirely on 
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Gomez’s testimony performed exactly the function Rule 701 
is designed to prevent. They assumed the role of juror in 
comparing photographs of Barnes and Fulton to the 
surveillance footage and concluding Fulton looked more like 
the robber than Barnes. 
 The government argues that it was entitled to present 
Scartozzi and Gomez’s opinion testimony regarding the 
appearances of Fulton and Barnes to rebut defense testimony 
on this point.155 At trial, Fulton asked Michael Calcaterra 
(Fulton’s roommate) and Rosalyn Torres (Fulton’s girlfriend 
at the time of the robbery) to review the surveillance images 
and opine on whether they depicted him. Both of those 
witnesses were intimately familiar with Fulton’s appearance. 
Therefore, as just explained, their testimony was appropriate. 
Michael Calcaterra testified Fulton had a different appearance 
from that of the robber in the surveillance footage.156  
Michael Calcaterra explained that the robber appeared to be 
“chunkier,”157 Fulton was a “little more defined,”158 and 
Fulton’s head was smaller.159 Torres testified similarly.160 In 
response, the government asked Gomez and Scartozzi to 
review the images and offer their opinions.161 
 But the government is not entitled to elicit improper 
lay opinion testimony to counter the defense’s proper opinion 
evidence. As Fulton points out, the government’s argument 
boils down to this: “because the defense elicited testimony 
from individuals with personal knowledge of Fulton that 
undermined the government’s theory of the case, the 
government was entitled to respond with lay opinions from 
Gomez and Scartozzi, regardless of the requirements of Rule 
701.”162 We know of no authority for the proposition that 
otherwise inadmissible evidence is admissible to rebut 
                                                                                                     
his review of photographs of [the defendant] and witnesses’ 
descriptions of him”). 
155 Appellee’s Br. at 15. 
156 J.A. 208-10, 211-12, J.A. 215-16. 
157 J.A. 209. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 215-26. 
160 J.A. 609-10. 
161 Appellee’s Br. at 15. 
162 Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9.  
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evidence that hurts a party’s case. Rather, the government 
must show that Scartozzi and Gomez’s testimony meets Rule 
701’s requirements. It cannot make such a showing. 
 The concurrence also contends that this testimony was 
proper because it was elicited for the purpose of explaining 
why the officers eliminated Barnes as a suspect. However, 
much of Gomez’s crucial lay opinion testimony regarding 
Fulton’s appearance and its similarity to the robber’s was 
solicited as part of Gomez’s initial testimony regarding who 
he thought the culprit was.163 This testimony was solicited 
before the issue of Barnes was even introduced. Therefore, 
government presented opinion testimony that went beyond 
merely explaining the exclusion of Barnes as a suspect: This 
opinion testimony told the jury that the robber in the 
surveillance video looked like Fulton. Moreover, the district 
court never instructed the jury that the evidence should only 
be considered as background to explain why the investigation 
focused on Fulton. 
 Since the opinions of Scartozzi and Gomez were not 
helpful to the jury under Rule 701(b), we need not determine 
if they meet Rule 701’s other requirements.  
 
3. 
 
Although the district court erred in admitting Scartozzi 
and Gomez’s lay opinion testimony regarding the 
appearances of Barnes and Fulton, Fulton must once again 
establish that this mistake amounts to plain error to obtain 
relief. Here, the jury was able to view the surveillance 
photographs and compare them to the appearances of both 
Fulton and Barnes. Although the officers’ interpretation of the 
evidence may well have influenced the jurors’ assessment of 
the photos, the jury ultimately knew it was tasked with 
interpreting the exact same evidence as the officers. The 
jurors could rely on their own assessments of the photos, 
rather than those of Scartozzi and Gomez.  
 Moreover, Fulton’s lay witnesses, Calcaterra and 
Torres, rebutted the officers’ identification testimony. The 
jurors were free to give more weight to Calcaterra and Torres’ 
testimony than that of Gomez and Scartozzi.  
                                              
163 J.A. 768-775. 
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 Nevertheless, a note of caution is warranted. We do 
not doubt that jurors may well be inclined to attach special 
significance to the identification testimony of law 
enforcement officers. Jurors may assume that the officers’ 
training places them in a unique position to draw comparisons 
and reach conclusions in evaluating evidence. Regrettably, 
this tendency may persist despite an instruction that tells 
jurors they are the ultimate finders of facts and must rely on 
their own assessment of the evidence.  
 Despite this vexing issue, we must assess the impact of 
the error in context with all of the evidence of Fulton’s guilt. 
Because the other evidence is not insignificant, we find that 
this error survives the harmless error inquiry. Fulton’s 
telephone call to Echevarria in which he acknowledged 
awareness of the bank robbery that had just occurred is 
particularly damning. Absent this and the other evidence 
tying Fulton to the robbery, it would be very difficult to 
conclude that these erroneous evidentiary rulings were 
harmless. 
 
C. Expert Testimony 
 
 Fulton also argues for the first time on appeal that 
Gomez’s testimony regarding the suspect’s height based on 
Gomez’s estimation of the elevation of the bank counters was 
improper expert testimony. Accordingly, he contends that this 
testimony should have been elicited, if at all, from an expert 
after a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.164  
 We disagree. As we have explained,  
The prototypical example of the type of 
evidence contemplated by the adoption of Rule 
701 relates to the appearance of persons or 
things, identity, the manner of conduct, 
competency of a person, degrees of light or 
darkness, sound, size, weight, distance, and an 
endless number of items that cannot be 
                                              
164 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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described factually in words apart from 
inferences.165  
 
“[L]ay testimony is improper where it encompasses opinions 
that call for specialized skill or expertise—such as a 
paramedic’s testimony that skull trauma caused the bruises on 
a victim’s face.”166 Nevertheless, we have also clarified that 
this does  
not mean that an expert is always necessary 
whenever the testimony is of a specialized or 
technical nature. When a lay witness has 
particularized knowledge by virtue of her 
experience, she may testify—even if the subject 
matter is specialized or technical—because the 
testimony is based upon the layperson’s 
personal knowledge rather than on specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.167  
 
Therefore, as long as the technical components of the 
testimony are based on the lay witness’s personal knowledge, 
such testimony is usually permissible. 
 Gomez banked at the branch office that was robbed 
and was personally familiar with the height of the counters.168 
His personal knowledge afforded him a reference point to 
opine on the stature of the suspect. This fits squarely within 
the definition of lay witness testimony. Fulton claims that 
Gomez’s testimony relied on a technique called “reverse 
projection photogrammetry”169 to determine the suspect’s 
height, but this claim is a real reach. Gomez did not measure 
the height of the counters and then calculate the suspect’s 
height based on that measurement. Instead, he merely 
                                              
165 Asplundh Mfg. Div., a Div. of Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. 
Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 
417 (1952)). 
166 United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 401 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
167 Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 81 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
168 J.A. 769. 
169 Appellant’s Br. at 33. 
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described the suspect’s height in reference to a landmark with 
which he was personally familiar. That is more akin to lay 
opinion testimony than expert testimony. 
Moreover, even if we assume that Gomez’s testimony 
was erroneously admitted expert testimony, this error would 
not have been “‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to 
reasonable dispute.’”170 Accordingly, assuming arguendo that 
this was error, it does not rise to the level of plain error. 
Fulton is thus not entitled to relief on the basis of the 
admission of that testimony.  
 
III. 
 
 Fulton also argues that the prosecution misstated the 
GPS evidence during closing arguments. He contends that 
this misstatement deprived him of a fair trial. Our inquiry is 
once again for plain error because Fulton did not object to the 
prosecution’s statement at trial.171 We conclude that the 
district court did not err. 
 
A. 
 
 At trial, Dr. Richard Fuller, an expert in the field of 
global navigation satellite systems, interpreted the GPS 
tracker’s location data for the jury.172 Dr. Fuller explained the 
GPS’s pathway and the reliability of the data associated with 
this device. Most importantly, he explained Government 
Exhibit 534A,173 which depicts where the GPS was located 
from 4:14:47 p.m. to 4:16:19 p.m.174 The figure below 
recreates Government Exhibit 534A with labels for the 
different portions of the residence. 
 
                                              
170 United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) 
(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 
171 See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 
(1993). 
172 Fuller actually helped invent the GPS device used in this 
case. J.A. 238-39 (Fuller). 
173 J.A. 1226. 
174 J.A. 1239. 
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2-6 John Ave. with GPS Data (Government Exhibit 534A) 
 
 
 
 
This exhibit was rotated ninety degrees counter-clockwise 
when displayed at trial. In Government Exhibit 534A, 
Barnes’ half of the residence appeared in the upper half of the 
image. At trial, Fuller first explained that the circles and 
ellipses above are error circles and ellipses, indicating “both 
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the confidence and statistical distribution of the [GPS] 
data.”175 As he explained,  
An error ellipse will take into account not just 
the overall accuracy of the data, but the error 
ellipse will also take into account the geometry, 
the precise geometry that’s available from the 
satellites at a given time, so, it’s a little bit more 
precise in general than the error circle, but both 
are meant to indicate same information, that you 
have a certain level of confidence where a 
particular device is at a given time. . . . It is 
meant to give you an indication of the 
confidence of the estimate of that point. . . . 
[T]he ellipse gives you an idea of how confident 
you are in that estimate. A larger ellipse means 
lower confidence. A smaller ellipse means 
higher confidence in the precision of that 
individual point.176 
 
He then clarified that the color of the error ellipses 
corresponds to the strength of the GPS signal: “the higher the 
signal level, the higher your confidence in your position.”177 
He clarified that green error ellipses (light grey in the figure 
above) represent the best signal conditions, blue are second 
best (dark grey in the figure above), and brown are third 
(none pictured in the figure above). He stated that, 
statistically, there is a “68 percent likelihood” that the GPS is 
within a given error ellipses, leaving “a 32 percent chance 
that it’s outside the ellipses.”178 
 Fuller matched the error ellipses derived from the GPS 
data with the location of roads and objects on Google Earth. 
They matched. In other words, the GPS data indicated that the 
device traveled on roads before reaching 2-6 John Avenue, 
lending creditability to the accuracy of the GPS data. He 
explained: “if there [were] offsets of the road data from the 
image data or the GPS data from either one of those two, it 
would call into question in my mind whether one or – one 
                                              
175 J.A. 258. 
176 Id. at 258-59.  
177 Id. at 284. 
178 Id. at 299. 
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part of that data is incorrect.”179 Here, however, “[t]he road 
overlays on the image data were on to a meter level roughly, 
and the positioning information on the places where [the 
GPS] was most easy to identify at early in the track were very 
correlated to both the road and image data.”180 This 
correlation between the imagery, the mapping data, and the 
GPS data gave Fuller a “significant level of trust in the three 
correlating, the three being correct as looking at the overall 
track [of the GPS].”181 
 Using Exhibit 534A, Fuller explained that the GPS 
moved from the road towards the house on the side closer to 
Barnes’ part of the residence.182 The earliest point of data 
near the house is labeled in Figure 2. The GPS then moved 
from the right to left half of the residence depicted in Figure 
2. The part of Fuller’s testimony that is critical to Fulton’s 
argument on appeal reads as follows: 
 
Question: And so, am I correct that some of 
these error ellipses overlap the inside and the 
outside of the house? 
 
Fuller: Yes. 
 
Question: And some of them are fully 
contained within? 
 
Fuller: Yes. 
 
Question: And can you tell the jury what period 
of time this video covers? 
 
Fuller: This covers from 4:14:47 p.m. . . . till 
4:16:19 p.m., . . . so approximately a 90-second 
period. 
 
Question: And have you reached any expert 
opinions to a reasonable degree of certainty in 
                                              
179 Id. at 267. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 268.  
182 J.A. 290.  
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your field about where the device was during 
this period of time? 
 
Fuller: The device is located at [2-6 John] 
during this period and it appeared -- it has a 
higher concentration of points in the southwest 
corner of [2 John] than any other place in the 
building. 
 
Question: Can you reach an expert opinion 
based on just one of these ellipses? 
 
Fuller: It would be difficult based on a single 
point to make a determination of a definitive 
nature. The overlapping of these points and the 
combination of these points increases the 
confidence in the estimate that it’s at this 
location. In essence, the probability increases as 
you get more of these overlapping one another. 
 
Question: And where are the vast majority of 
the overlapping ellipses? 
 
Fuller: In the southwest corner of [2-6 John]. 
 
Question: Have you reached an opinion as to 
whether or not the device was inside the 
building? 
 
Fuller: The most logical place would purport to 
be inside the building. Two other alternates 
could exist. One, it was on top of the building, it 
was on the roof. The data does not necessarily 
confirm or rule that out, . . . or conceivably, 
since I’m not showing altitude here, it could be 
underneath the building as well.  
 Underneath the building is far less likely 
. . . . It just seems to make more sense to be 
inside the structure than on top of it from a -- 
from a time perspective, since we’re only 
talking about a minute and a half, as well as just 
the physical access portion of it. 
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Question: So, just to clarify, Dr. Fuller, when 
you say outside, you’re talking about literally 
on top? 
 
Fuller: On top of the house, correct. On top of 
it as compared to inside the building.183 
 
When questioned about his opinion that the “most logical 
place” for the GPS to have been was inside the house, Fuller 
explained that he based his opinion on the “preponderance of 
points overlapping one another directly inside the enclosure 
or the visual enclosure of this building, the area covered by 
that structure, as well as the confidence of the data level, the 
signal quality during this period of the track.”184 Fuller never 
described 2-6 John with reference to specific rooms. Instead, 
he used directional terms (“southwest corner”) to describe the 
GPS’s location. Again, Exhibit 534A depicted 2-6 John 
Avenue as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 To aid jurors in interpreting this location data, 
Lieutenant Gomez testified that Fulton’s room was located 
                                              
183 Id. at 293-95 (emphasis added).  
184 Id. at 296-97.  
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exactly where the majority of the overlapping ellipses 
appeared. When shown Exhibit 534A, Gomez testified that 
Fulton’s room was in “the back left corner of [2 John 
Avenue].”185  
 Fulton claims that Gomez’s testimony was incorrect 
and misleading186 because Fulton’s room was located in what 
is more accurately described as the upper left hand corner of 
the lower half of 2-6 John. From the trial transcript it is 
difficult to tell whether Gomez’s testimony was inaccurate. 
Generally speaking, Fulton’s room is in the lower left hand 
corner. When Government Exhibit 534A is broken into 4 
quadrants, Fulton’s room is in the lower left hand quadrant. 
 During its summation, the government further relied 
on Fuller’s testimony to argue that the GPS was in Fulton’s 
bedroom for ninety seconds. More specifically, the prosecutor 
stated: 
the GPS tracking device was in the defendant’s 
bedroom, inside the defendant’s house for 
approximately 90 seconds, reporting every six 
to eight seconds. We heard Dr. Fuller tell us 
again and again and again right over the 
defendant’s bedroom.187 
 
And during rebuttal argument, the government repeated: 
“[Fuller’s] analysis told him in his expert opinion, based on 
his 20 years in the field, that the device was in the defendant’s 
bedroom. That is uncontradicted testimony.”188  
 Fulton also argues that this testimony is incorrect. 
While Fulton is technically right that Fuller never testified 
that the GPS was in his bedroom, Fuller did testify that the 
“most logical place” for the GPS to have been was the 
southwest corner of 2-6 John. As Government Exhibit 534A 
demonstrated, this area included Fulton’s bedroom. 
Therefore, the prosecutor’s argument was, at worst, a slight 
mischaracterization of Fuller’s testimony. However, it was a 
fair inference based on that testimony.  
 
                                              
185 Id. at 776. 
186 Appellant’s Br. at 38.  
187 J.A. 1110.  
188 Id. at 1155.  
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B. 
 
 Fulton argues that the district court plainly erred in 
failing to strike the government’s characterization of Fuller’s 
testimony about the location of the GPS in closing. We 
disagree. It is fundamental that counsel may “argue 
reasonable inferences from the evidence,” but may not 
“misstate evidence.”189 A prosecutor’s misstatement of the 
evidence can “‘so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”190 To 
determine whether a prosecutor’s comments deprived a 
defendant of a fair trial requiring reversal, an appellate court 
must consider the “offensive actions in context and in light of 
the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, the 
effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant.”191 Furthermore, where the 
appellant did not object to the contested statements at trial, as 
is the case here, our standard of review is even more 
deferential. Therefore, even if Fulton can show that a legal 
error occurred, he must also show that this error was plain or 
                                              
189 United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 784 (6th Cir. 2001); 
see also United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (“It is error for counsel to make statements in 
closing argument unsupported by evidence, to misstate 
admitted evidence, or to misquote a witness’ testimony.”). 
190 Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)); see United 
States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A] 
single misstep on the part of the prosecutor may be so 
destructive of the right to a fair trial that reversal is 
mandated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
191 Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en 
banc) (in assessing the prejudice of a prosecutor’s improper 
comments during closing argument, this Court considers “the 
scope of the objectionable comments and their relationship to 
the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative 
instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting 
the defendant’s conviction”).  
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obvious,192 and affected “the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”193 As we have explained, 
“‘In order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct under a 
plain error standard, the review must reveal egregious error or 
a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”194 
 Fulton argues that the government made three errors in 
closing: First, as just discussed, he contends that the 
government erroneously stated that the GPS was in Fulton’s 
bedroom for ninety seconds. In reality, the device was fully 
inside the residence for sixty seconds—during the other thirty 
seconds, the GPS was transported from outside the house to 
inside. Next, Fulton argues that the government mistakenly 
stated that Fuller testified the GPS was in Fulton’s room. We 
have already explained that Fuller actually testified that the 
GPS was most likely in the general area where Fulton’s 
bedroom, the kitchen, and bathroom were located. Finally, 
Fulton contends that the prosecution misrepresented the 
precision of the GPS data to the jury. According to Fulton, a 
more accurate restatement of Fuller’s testimony would be 
“the device was, (1) for approximately one minute, (2) in the 
southwest portion of the building, with the understanding that 
(3) there was a 32% chance that it was not in any given ‘error 
ellipse,’ that (4) the data could not tell whether it was inside, 
underneath, or on top of the building, and that (5) because it 
was moving either very slowly or not at all during that time, 
uncertainty about the device’s position was increased.”195 
Fulton contends that, collectively, these errors deprived him 
of a fair trial.  
In support of this position, Fulton first cites United 
States v. Watson.196 There, the court of appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held a prosecutor’s misstatements were sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a new trial. The critical issue in Watson 
was whether the defendant, Watson, had a connection to 
                                              
192 United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) 
(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 
193 Id.  
194 United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotations marks omitted)).  
195 Appellant’s Br. at 41. 
196 171 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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drugs found in a car.197 Watson did not own the car, and no 
witness or fingerprint evidence placed him in the car.198 To 
establish a connection between Watson and the car, the 
government relied on (1) a key to the car that the police found 
on Watson when he was arrested, (2) a bag from a store that 
was found in the car and contained crack, and (3) a receipt 
from that store found in Watson’s home.199 Defense 
witnesses, however, testified that Watson was in church for 
the part of the evening in question and disputed police 
testimony that Watson had the car key when he was 
arrested.200 Defense witnesses connected another man, 
Hawkins, to the car and the key at the relevant time.201  
In an attempt to strengthen Watson’s connection to the 
car, the government tried to establish that the car’s registered 
owner, Tyra Jackson, was Watson’s girlfriend.202 In doing so, 
however, the prosecution asked a witness (Mr. Thomas) a 
compound question which (1) assumed a fact not in evidence, 
i.e., that Jackson was Watson’s girlfriend, and (2) made the 
witness’s response ambiguous: “Mr. Thomas, you believe that 
you know Watson’s girlfriend, Tyra Jackson, right?” To 
which Thomas replied: “I never testified I knew her or 
not.”203 The prosecutor then asked, “You believe that you 
may have met her once or twice, right?” Thomas’s response: 
“Maybe.”204 In closing, the prosecutor purported to quote 
Thomas and told the jury that Jackson was Watson’s 
girlfriend, therein establishing a stronger connection between 
Watson and the car than the disputed evidence of the key and 
the store receipt.205 The prosecutor repeated the point during 
rebuttal argument. Despite this material misstatement of the 
evidence, the district court provided only the “standard 
                                              
197 Id. at 697. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 697, 698-99. 
203 Id. at 699. 
204 Id. 
205 Id.  
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instructions that counsel’s questions, statements, and 
arguments are not evidence.”206  
 On appeal, the court held that the statements clearly 
misstated the evidence and these misstatements prejudiced the 
defendant.207 “[T]he case was close, and credibility was 
key.”208 In so holding, the court applied a three-factor test 
considering “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the 
issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the 
effects of the error.”209 The court also clarified that, unlike in 
our circuit, “this test applies regardless of whether our review 
is for harmless error or plain error.”210 The court then 
concluded that the error warranted reversal because: 
witnesses offered different versions of key events, the other 
evidence linking Watson to the car was weak, and the 
testimony at issue pertained to a critical issue—whether 
Watson had a connection to the car.211 The court also held 
that the district court’s standard jury instructions explaining 
that counsel’s questions and arguments were not evidence 
were insufficient to mitigate the prejudice.212 There, the trial 
court’s error “went to the heart of the government’s case on a 
matter with respect to which the government had no other 
weighty evidence.” Thus, the defendant had “demonstrated 
substantial prejudice warranting a new trial.”213  
 Fulton also relies upon our decision in United States v. 
Mastrangelo.214 There, the government charged the defendant 
with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. The 
parties stipulated that the defendant “had the chemical 
                                              
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 700. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. (noting the test for prejudice has also been framed “‘in 
terms of the severity of the prosecutor’s misconduct, the 
measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of 
conviction absent the improper remarks’” (quoting United 
States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 700-01. 
212 Id. at 701-02. 
213 Id. at 702. 
214 172 F.3d 288, 295-98 (3d Cir. 1999). 
41 
 
background to know the ingredients and equipment necessary 
to make methamphetamine.”215 But the defendant denied 
knowing how to make the drug, and the government did not 
present evidence proving this fact. Nevertheless, in closing 
argument, the prosecutor erroneously stated that the 
defendant knew how to make the drug: the defendant “had the 
knowledge, the knowledge to either make it—make the 
methamphetamine or to tell someone else how to make it.”216 
The prosecutor repeated this statement multiple times. Based 
on these misstatements, the defense moved for a mistrial. But 
the district court denied the motion.  
 
 Instead, the trial court gave the following jury 
instruction:  
The parties stipulated that the defendant had the 
chemical background to make 
methamphetamine. The Government, [] in its 
closing made reference to the fact [that] there 
was no evidence presented that anyone else had 
this chemical background and that therefore by 
inference the defendant, since he possessed this 
knowledge, must necessarily have been the 
maker. Such an inference is improper and 
should be stricken from your minds. There was 
no burden on the defense to produce evidence 
that no one else did or did not possess chemical 
knowledge to make methamphetamine. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case 
that no one else did not have the knowledge to 
make methamphetamine.217  
 
However, we recognized that the district court’s curative 
instruction misstated the stipulation. It repeated the 
prosecutor’s mistakes, therein compounding the error (“The 
                                              
215 Id. at 294. 
216 Id. at 296 (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
217 Id. (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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parties stipulated that the defendant had the chemical 
background to make methamphetamine.”).218 
 
 We concluded that the “impropriety of these 
statements is evident.”219  
They distort the substance of the Stipulation, 
inflating the limited stipulation that 
Mastrangelo had the chemical background to 
know the ingredients and equipment necessary 
to make methamphetamine to encompass a 
meaning that the District Court had previously 
ruled unwarranted, i.e., that because of his 
knowledge of the ingredients and equipment 
needed, Mastrangelo knew how to make 
methamphetamine.220  
 
We further noted that although “[a]rguably, a clear and 
forceful curative instruction from the District Court might 
have cured the potentially devastating effect of the 
prosecutor’s misrepresentations,” the district court’s own 
misstatement of the stipulation “if it did not further confuse 
the jury, certainly did not effect a cure.”221  
 We therefore found clear error and focused on whether 
the error was prejudicial. We looked at familiar factors: “the 
scope of the improper comments in the overall trial context, 
the effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength 
of the evidence against the defendant.”222 We found the 
repeated misrepresentations “central,” the attempted curative 
instruction faulty, and the other evidence less than 
overwhelming.223 Accordingly, we concluded that the errors 
                                              
218 Id. (emphasis in original).  
219 Id.  
220 Id. Common sense illustrates how egregious the error in 
Mastrangelo was. The fact that someone knows that H2O is 
the chemical composition of water does not establish that she 
knows how to combine hydrogen and oxygen in a laboratory 
to produce water. 
221 Id. at 298. 
222 Id. at 297 (citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 
1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)).  
223 Id. at 297-98. 
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pertaining to the stipulation were not harmless and remanded 
for a new trial.224  
 Fulton relies on these two cases to argue that the 
government’s statements regarding the GPS evidence were 
erroneous and prejudicial. Like Watson and Mastrangelo, this 
case turns on the contested evidence. Fulton argues that the 
government would not have had much of a case against him 
without the GPS evidence. The prosecution had no clear 
surveillance footage, eyewitness identifications, or physical 
evidence linking the GPS or money to Fulton. In addition, the 
defense raised a strong inference that someone else (Barnes) 
might be responsible for the crime. Defense counsel further 
offered testimony from witnesses intimately familiar with 
Fulton’s appearance that Fulton did not look like the man in 
the security footage. Therefore, according to Fulton, the 
government’s case came down to establishing where the GPS 
was immediately after the robbery. 
 The prosecutor first stated that the GPS device “was in 
the defendant’s bedroom, inside the defendant’s house for 
approximately 90 seconds.”225 The prosecutor then 
characterized Fuller’s testimony as stating “again and again” 
that the GPS was “right over the defendant’s bedroom.”226 
Finally, in rebuttal, the prosecutor repeated that “[Fuller’s] 
analysis told him in his expert opinion, based on his 20 years 
in the field, that the device was in the defendant’s bedroom. 
That is uncontradicted testimony.”227 
 As we have just explained, Fuller never stated that the 
GPS was in Fulton’s room or “over” Fulton’s bedroom 
verbatim. However, he did testify that the GPS appeared to be 
in the “southwest” corner of 2-6 John for about sixty seconds, 
and moving into or out of that portion of the house for an 
additional thirty seconds. This southwest corner includes 
Fulton’s bedroom and his shared kitchen. Therefore, a 
perfectly accurate summation of Fuller’s testimony would 
have been: “Fuller told us the GPS was inside a portion of [2-
6 John] that contained Fulton’s room and Fulton’s kitchen for 
                                              
224 Id. at 298. 
225 J.A. 1110.  
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 1155. 
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60 seconds, and moving into or out of that portion of the 
house for an additional 30 seconds.”  
 Nevertheless, we do not think it improper to infer from 
Fuller’s testimony that the GPS was in the defendant’s 
room.228 The GPS data did indicate that the GPS was in, on 
top of, or below an area that included Fulton’s room for 
approximately sixty seconds. Furthermore, Fuller testified 
that the GPS was most likely not below the house, and it 
seems improbable that it had been on top of the house. It was 
certainly reasonable to argue that the GPS was inside the 
house, likely in Fulton’s room. The error here was that the 
prosecutor inaccurately ascribed precision to Fuller’s 
testimony. 
 This error is not as significant as those in Watson and 
Mastrangelo. In Watson, the prosecution’s error created a 
connection between the defendant and a key piece of 
evidence that was completely unsupported by the record. In 
Mastrangelo, the prosecution unfairly ascribed crucial 
knowledge to the defendants that was not supported by the 
evidence. Here, the prosecution’s statement was a reasonable 
inference drawn from Fuller’s testimony. A perfectly accurate 
summation of Fuller’s testimony still inculpates Fulton. The 
statement “Dr. Fuller’s analysis lead him to conclude, in his 
expert opinion, that the GPS was inside a portion of [2-6 
John] compromised of Fulton’s room and a kitchen Fulton 
shared,” is not much weaker evidence of Fulton’s guilt than 
the statement “[Dr. Fuller’s] analysis concluded in his expert 
opinion . . . that the device was in the defendant’s bedroom.” 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the prosecution’s 
misstatement altered the outcome of the trial.  
                                              
228 It is well-settled that the Government “‘is entitled to 
considerable latitude in summation to argue the evidence and 
any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence.’” United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 
(3d Cir. 1991)). The government “may ‘ask the jury to draw 
permissible inferences from anything that appears in the 
record.’” United States v. Sullivan, 803 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 
1986) (quoting Oliver v. Zimmerman, 720 F.2d 766, 770 (3d 
Cir. 1983)). 
45 
 
 Similarly, the prosecution’s statement that the GPS 
spent ninety seconds inside Fulton’s room when, in reality, 
the GPS was only fully inside (over or under) that portion of 
the house for sixty seconds, and moving into or out of (over 
or under) the house for an additional thirty seconds is hardly 
prejudicial. In Watson and Mastrangelo, the absence of the 
prosecution’s misstatement would have seriously weakened 
the government’s case. Not so here. It is highly probative that 
the GPS was in Fulton’s half of the house at all, whether for 
sixty seconds or ninety seconds.  
 Moreover, defense counsel was willing to rest on the 
court’s general jury instruction that jurors must find the facts 
for themselves based upon their recollection of the evidence. 
Following the government’s rebuttal summation, Fulton 
raised a concern about other portions of the government’s 
argument, claiming that there was no evidence to support 
them.229 Defense counsel clarified, however: “I’m not asking 
for a curative instruction, your Honor, because I am aware of 
the Court’s standard instruction with regards to opening 
statements and closing statements.”230 Had Fulton objected, 
the court could have clarified that Fuller’s testimony placed 
the GPS in the southwest portion of the residence, which 
undisputedly contained Fulton’s bedroom. 
 Finally, to the extent that Fulton suggests the 
prosecution erred in stating that the GPS was in Fulton’s 
room because the GPS data does not permit this type of 
location accuracy, it was incumbent on defense counsel to 
stress that limitation during his summation. Although litigants 
cannot misrepresent evidence, they are not required to 
affirmatively point out limitations in the scope of their 
evidence. Fulton was free to contradict the prosecution’s 
argument that the GPS was in Fulton’s room based on the 
data accuracy.  
 In assessing the prejudice of the prosecutor’s 
comments during closing argument, we must consider “the 
scope of the objectionable comments and their relationship to 
the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative 
instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting 
                                              
229 J.A. 1159-60. 
230 J.A. 1160. 
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the defendant’s conviction.”231 The GPS evidence here was 
strong, even without the prosecution’s slight 
mischaracterization. Indeed, it is not at all obvious that 
clarifying the limited scope of Fuller’s testimony or offering 
more precise instructions regarding what Fuller actually said 
would have aided the defense at all. In fact, it may have only 
emphasized evidence that established the probability that the 
GPS had been taken to Fulton’s portion of the residence. 
Accordingly, we conclude that no legal error occurred insofar 
as the prosecutor’s summation is concerned.  Moreover, 
even if an error did occur, it did not rise to the level required 
for us to find plain error.  
 
IV. 
 
 Finally, Fulton argues that the district court’s errors, 
when combined, influenced the outcome of the trial. On a 
cumulative error challenge, a new trial is required “only when 
the errors, when combined, so infected the jury’s 
deliberations that they had a substantial influence on the 
outcome of the trial.”232 Because Fulton did not raise this 
challenge before the district court, we review for plain error.  
 The district court erred in admitting Scartozzi’s lay 
opinion testimony regarding whether Barnes was on the 
phone during the robbery. The court also erred in admitting 
Scartozzi and Gomez’s lay opinion testimony regarding the 
comparative appearances of Fulton, Barnes, and the robber. 
But it is clear from our review of this record that these errors 
did not deprive Fulton of a fair trial. As we have explained, 
the jurors listened to testimony explaining that the call to 
Barnes’ phone went to voicemail. Therefore, they were free to 
credit this testimony over that of Scartozzi. The jurors could 
also determine for themselves whether Fulton or Barnes 
looked more like the perpetrator captured in the surveillance 
footage. The evidence presented at trial was strong enough to 
prevent the case from turning on any propensity the jurors 
                                              
231 United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1995) (en banc). 
232 United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 
1994) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citation 
omitted). 
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may have had to unduly credit such testimony from law 
enforcement officers.  
 Furthermore, the testimony regarding the location of 
the GPS indicated that it spent time in, above, or below 
Fulton’s half of the house for significantly more time than it 
was in, below, or above Barnes’ half. Most damning of all, 
Fulton called his girlfriend’s sister and mentioned the robbery 
immediately after the GPS was smashed and before police 
had arrived in his neighborhood. This call was very strong 
circumstantial evidence of Fulton’s guilt. This evidence 
would not have been sufficient, by itself, to prove Fulton’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But when considered 
together with all of the other evidence in this case, that phone 
call pointed a very strong finger of guilt directly at Fulton.  
 Therefore, even without Scartozzi and Gomez’s 
testimony on the Barnes’ call and Fulton and Barnes’ 
appearances, the government’s case against Fulton was 
sufficient to establish guilt. Accordingly, reviewing the 
district court’s decision for plain error, we hold that the 
cumulative effect of the district court’s errors does not 
necessitate reversal. 
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Smith, J., concurring: 
 I concur in the judgment of the court and in the 
majority’s analysis of every issue except its conclusion that 
portions of the lay opinion testimony of officers Gomez and 
Scartozzi were improperly admitted.  The majority holds that 
much of the lay opinion testimony of both officers was 
improper because it was not helpful to the jury as required by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 701.  I disagree and thus write 
separately on this issue. 
 Lay opinion testimony is admissible as long as it is 
“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful 
to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701.  In Asplundh Manufacturing 
Division v. Benton Harbor Engineering, we held that “[t]he 
prototypical example of the type of evidence contemplated by 
the adoption of Rule 701 relates to the appearance of persons 
or things, identity, the manner of conduct, . . . sound, size, 
weight, distance, and an endless number of items that cannot 
be described factually in words apart from inferences.”  57 
F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995).    
 I believe the testimony elicited from both officers was 
very probative and helped the jury assess the quality and 
thoroughness of the officers’ investigation in this case.  This 
is a crucial issue given Fulton’s argument at trial that the 
police bungled their investigation by too quickly ruling out 
other potential suspects.  Fulton specifically suggested that 
his neighbor Mr. Barnes—a man of similar height and 
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(somewhat) similar stature—could have been the bank 
robber.  In light of the GPS evidence presented in this case 
placing the tracker in the building where both men lived, this 
appears to have been Fulton’s best defense.  In response to 
this claim, the prosecution elicited testimony from the two 
officers who conducted the investigation to show—as the 
questioning made clear—why the elimination of Barnes as a 
suspect was based on sound police work and was certainly 
not “hasty.”1 
 Indeed, we look no further than the beginning of the 
prosecution’s key line of questioning, which begins with a 
very relevant query: “why did you [officer Scartozzi] 
eliminate [Barnes]” as a suspect?  In response, Scartozzi 
explained that he eliminated Barnes because (1) “Ricardo 
Barnes did not match the physical descriptors of the bank 
robbery,” (2) Barnes’ phone data shows that he received a call 
at the exact time as the robbery, and (3) “Sprint PCMD data 
indicated that during the time of the bank robbery . . . 
[Barnes] was not near the bank,”  This testimony helped the 
jury determine whether Scartozzi’s investigation of Barnes 
was sufficiently thorough. 
 The majority rejects this position and instead contends 
that this testimony did not just “shed light on the 
thoroughness” of the police investigation but instead 
“provided a definitive interpretation of a crucial disputed 
fact—whether Barnes could have committed the robbery.”  I 
fully acknowledge that when “the jury has before it the same 
                                              
1 Whether this was, in fact, a thorough investigation was a 
question left for the jury. 
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circumstantial evidence . . . on which a witness bases an 
opinion concerning a defendant’s knowledge, testimony from 
a witness . . . [on that issue] usually will not meet Rule 
701(b)’s helpfulness requirement,” United States v. 
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1996), That, however, 
is not the case here.  The officers’ testimony addressed an 
issue solely within the knowledge of the officers’ themselves: 
how thorough was their investigation?  They alone could 
offer testimony as to the steps they took in ruling out Barnes 
as a suspect. 
 As we have explained on several occasions, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence suggest a “generally liberal 
approach to the admissibility of evidence.”  In re Unisys Sav. 
Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 167 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 
Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, subject to certain 
limitations, all evidence is admissible if it is relevant.”).  I 
thus believe that admission of this testimony better comports 
with both the general admissibility standards laid out in the 
federal rules and our long-held view that “[t]he modern trend 
favors the admission of opinion testimony, provided that it is 
well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to 
specific cross-examination.”  Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, 
Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Lauria v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600-01 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“As long as the circumstances can be presented with 
greater clarity by stating an opinion, then that opinion is 
helpful to the trier of fact.” (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)).   
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 I similarly take issue with the majority’s suggestion 
that the testimony here could have been admitted if Officer 
Scartozzi had stated that he discounted Barnes as a suspect 
because he assumed Barnes was on the phone based on the 
evidence he considered.  This minor tweak seems to be of 
little legal significance as here it was certainly clear to the 
jury based on the testimony elicited—and indeed it was made 
crystal clear on cross-examination—that Scartozzi never 
physically saw Barnes talking on the phone at some other 
location while the robbery was taking place at the PNC Bank.  
Instead, the jury was made aware through his testimony that 
Scartozzi could only have assumed (or rather, inferred) that 
Barnes was on the phone during the robbery based on his 
review of the phone logs.  Whether this was a proper 
inference was a contested issue for the jury to decide.  I 
would thus have concluded that Scartozzi’s statement: 
“Barnes was on the phone during the robbery” was 
sufficiently similar to (and really, mere shorthand for) the 
more precise statement: “my investigation led me to infer that 
Barnes was on the phone during the robbery,” for us to 
conclude that the testimony given was appropriate. 
 Accordingly, I would have upheld the District Court’s 
admission of the officers’ lay opinion testimony.  That said, I 
concur in the judgment. 
  
 
